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THE DIRECTION, MODE AND LOCATION OF CORPORATE EXPANSIONS
HARRY BARKEMA and SYTSE DOUMAt
Abstract
This paper examines data about 498 expansions that 14 large Dutch firms carried out between 1966 and
1982. Our evidence corroborates that óorizontal, related and vertical expansions are more beneficial than
unrelated expansions. We also fmd [hat managers had knowledge of these benefits before the expansion,
and improved this knowledge afterwards in case of acquisitions but not in case of start-ups. Finally, we
fmd that foreign start-ups induce relatively large Coasian efficiency gains and that domestic acquisitions
induce relatively large gains from market power.
t Department of Business Administration, Tilburg University, Postbox 90153, 5000 LE Tilburg, The
Netherlands.
THE DIRECTION, MODE AND LOCATION OF CORPORATE EXPANSIONS2
This paper provides a new methodology to test familiar hypotheses: that strategies of horizontal,
related and vertical expansion are more beneficial than a strategy of unrelated expansion. A large body of
literature already exists on the relative benefits from these strategies. Most studies óave found that firms
that have expanded horizontally or diversified into related industries perform better than firms that have
diversified into unrelated industries, although an increasing number of studies yields mixed results (Rum-
el[, 1974, 1982, Montgomery, 1979, 1985, Bettis, 1981, Bettis and Hall, 1982, Palepu, 1985, Varadarajan
and Ramanujam, 1987). Mixed results have also been obtained about the relative benefits from vertical
and unrelated expansion (Rumelt, 1974, 1982).
In their intluential review of this literature, Ramanujam and Varadarajan (1989) point out that
the present literature is dominated by cross-section studies of data about firms. Instead, these authors
emphasize that '(t)here is .. a need to shift the focus of analysis from overall profiles of firm diversity to
individual diversification projects and cumulative diversification experiences'. That is, there is a need for
studies that 1) analyze individual diversification projects; and 2) analyze what managers óave learned
from these projects. This analysis is carried out in the present paper. In addition, we analy~e horizon[al
and vertical expansions.
Z The authors have benefited from discussions with George Hendrikse, Theo Nijman and with
participants of the EARIE-meeting (European Associa[ion for Research in Industrial Economics) held in
Lisbon (Portugal) in 1990. Martijn Verbrugh and Gert-Jan van Dongen provided excellent research
assistance.
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Our analysis consists of two steps. First, we tes[ the prediction that firms invest more in horizon-
tal, related and vertical expansions and less in unrelated expansions than if firms had expanded 'random-
ly': without considering differential benefits from these various directions of expansion.~ This provides a
test of the hypotheses in conjunction with the assumption of 'ex ante rationality': that managers had (at
least some) knowledge of the hypotheses at the time of the expansion and acted accordingly. In the
second step we test the prediction that firms divest fewer horízontal, related and vcrtical expansions and
more unrelated expansions than if they had divested at random, without considering the differential be-
nefits from the various directions of expansion. This provides a test of the hypotheses in conjunction with
the assumption of 'ex post rationality': that managers increased their knowledge of the hypotheses after -
and presumably from - the expansions and acted accordingly, or at least that they have done so in the
past.2
In addition, we derive and test hypotheses about [he mode (start-up or acquisition) and location
(domestic or foreign) of corporate expansions. We hypothesize that foreign start-ups induce relatively
large Coasian efficiency gains and that domestic acquisitions induce relatively large gains from increased
market power. These hypotheses are also tested in conjundion with the assumption of ex ante and ex
post ra[ionality. All hypotheses are tested on data about 498 expansions that 14 large non-financial Dutch
firms carried out between 196G and 1982.
HYPOTHESF.S
The first two hypotheses to be tested in this paper are 1) that horizontal and 2) related
expansions are more beneficial than unrelated expansions. Since these hypotheses are well known, and
since this paper focuses on methodological issues, the discussion of these hypotheses will be concise.
Horiwatal expansion is expected to be more beneficial than unrelated expansion because of increased
gains from market power and because of economies of scale. Related expansion is expected to be more
beneficial than unrelated expansion because of economies of scope. Such economies arise when two pro-
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ducts share the use of a common production factor. In a world with transaction costs, it can be beneficial
to realize economies of scope and scale within one firm (Teece, 1982). So our fust hypotheses are:
Hl - Horizontal expansion is more beneficial than unrelated expansion;
Hz - Related expansion is more beneficial than unrelated expansion;
Rumelt (1974) finds that vertically integrated firms aze among the worst performers. In his 1982
paper he suggests that this bad performance is due to industry-effects and [hat, if such effects are
controlled for, the performance of vertically integrated firms dces no[ differ from the average performan-
ce in their industries. Rumel[ dces not provide a theoretical basis for this hypothesis, but his evidence is
consistent with it. Alterna[ively, theory abou[ vertical integration is presented by Williamson (1975), who
argues that vertical integration allows fums to economize on transaction costs. Also, if two subsequent
stages in a production process require similar technological know-how and if it is costly [o trade such
know-how across markets, vertical integration allows economies of scope. This leads to the following
hypothesis:
H3 - vcrtical expansion is more beneficial than unrelated expansion;
The hypo[heses Hl - H3 will be tested in such a way that other dimensions of the firm's
expansion strategy: its mode and location, are explicitly statistically controlled for. Hencc, as we will
explain in more de[ail in our methodological section, potential omitted variables-problems of previous
empirical studies are avoided. Furthermore, insight into differential benefits from various modes and
locations of corporate expansions are also interesting in their own right. Below we derive some
hypotheses about the mode and location of expansions.
An extensive literature exists on why fums expand internationally through d'rrect ínvestment
rather than through licensing or exporting (for overviews, see Rugman, 1985, and Teece, 1986). The
Hymer-Kindleberger-Caves industrial organization approach emphasizes the ability of multinational
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enterprises (MNEs) to close markets through product differentiation, distribution networks, and so on,
which allows MNEs to reap monopoly gains. Alternatively, the Coasian school of thought emphasizes
that direct foreign investment allows fums with unique assets (e.g. brand name) or abilities (e.g.
technological or organizational know-how) to economize on transaction costs. Hence costs are avoided
that would otherwise occur through licensing, such as technological misappropriation and costly haggling
between licensor and licensee, through exporting, such as natural transaction costs and international tariff
and non-tariff barriers erected by foreign governments, and so on (Teece, 1981, 1985, 1986).
So the Hymer-Kindleberger-Caves approach argues that MNEs aze rent seeking and the Coasian
approach argues that MNEs are efficiency seeking.3 In our view, the two explanations are not mutually
exclusive and we expect firms to pursue either strategy, whenever i[ is profitable 4 Moreover, we expect
that monopoly gains from market closing are relatively large in case fums that already have a large
market share increase their market share substantially. This is most likely to happen in case of domestic
acquisitions, when a firm that possibly already has a major market share may substantially enlarge its
share both because an acquisition increases fum sales substantially and a competitor is neutralized. The
resulting market share may be large enough to reap substantial gains from market power. In case of
foreign acquisitions, firms usually set out from a much smaller markel share. So we predict thet domestic
acquisitions are more beneficial [han foreign acquisitionss
Furthermore, gains from overcoming market failures seem relatively large in case of foreign
start-ups, which provide new opportunities to exploit fum specific assets, skills, and so on. These gains
are expected to be larger than in case of start-ups on the home market where these assets and skills are
already in use. In addition, foreign start-ups enable firms to acquire relevant information about foreign
markets and technologies and to channel this information to other plants of the fum or to headquarters.
Other advantages of foreign start-ups relative to domestic start-ups are that tariff and non-tariff barriers
are overcome and that the firm can offer improved services to its intemational customers.b This leads to
the following testable óypotheses:~
H4 - Domcslic acquisitions are more beneficial lhan foreign acquisitions;
HS - Foreign stazt-ups are more benificial than domestic s[art-ups;
5
The above Iheory illustrates that strategic decisions about the mode and the location of
corporate expansions are interrelated. This extends previous work on the interrelation of the direction
and mode (Simmonds, 1990) and of the direction and location (Geringer, Beamish and daCosta, 1989) of
corporate expansions. Furthermore, our theory implies that empirical studies that examine the mode of
expansions but not their location may fail to distinguish between two effects that work in opposing ways:
gains Gom increased market power that are relative large in case of domestic acquisitions and Coasian
efficiency gains that are relatively large in case of foreign start-ups. In theory, this lack of distinction may
explain the inconclusive empirical results in Simmonds (1990) who, contrary to his predictions, dces not
Fmd that start-ups are significandy more successful than acquisitions. Whether our explanation of
Simmonds' inconclusive results is indeed valid is also tested in this paper.
METHODOLOGY
General aspects
Our methodology consists of two steps. The first step is consistent with the methodology that is
common in mains[ream econonomics. In this step we tes[ [he hypotheses in conjunction with the
assumption of (at least some) 'ex ante rationality': that managers óad knowledge of the hypotheses
before the expansion took place and acted accordingly. Hence on the basis of the hypothesis that
horiwntal expansions are more beneficial than unrelated expansions, we expect that firms invested more
oftcn in horizontal cxpansions (relativc to unrelatcd expansions) than if firms had expandcd 'at random':
without considering the hypothesized benefi[s. Similar predictions follow from hypotheses HZ - H5. These
predictions will be tested in the remainder of this paper.
In our second step we treat the firm's expansion strategy as given, as ia most previous studies in
the strategic management literature that followed Rumelt (1974). In this step we [est the hypotheses in
conjunetion with the assttmption of (at least some) 'ex post ra[ionalit}~: that managers learned about Ihe
hypotheses from their experience with expansions. Hence given the hypo[hesis that horizontal expansions
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are more beneficial than unrelated expansions, we expect that unrelated expansions were divested more
often than horizontal expansions, compared to a setting where fu-ms óad divested 'at random': without
having learned about the hypothesized benefits. Similar predictions follow from Hz to HS. These
predictions will also be [ested in the remainder of [his paper.
New about our methodology is that we combine both steps. As mentioned above, the first step: a
test of the hypotheses in conjunction with the assumption of ex ante rationality, is common in mainstre-
am economics, although the operationaliza[ion of a'random strategy', to be discussed below, is new. Also
it is not new to analyze differences in divestment rates of individual projects, as we do in the second step
of our analysis. Differential divestment rates of rela[ed and unrelated expansions have previously been
analyzed in Porter (1987), although we extend Porter's analysis in several ways: by adding tests about
horizonlal and vertical expansions, by controlling for potential omitted variables-problems associated with
the mode and location of expansions, by calculating the significance of differences in divestment rates,
and so on. What is new about our methodology is that the two steps are carried out in one analysis,
appGed to one data set, and that we are expficit about the assumptions about the rationality of managers
in both steps. This mcthodology allows conclusions about the validity of the hypotheses, about what
managcrs kncw about the hypotheses ex ante, and whal thcy Iearned aboul them ex pcxt ( or what
'cumulative diversificalion experiences' they acquired). Our tesl will lead to one of the following 4
resul[s.
I) Significant support for the hypotheses is found in both steps. This corroborates the hypotheses, and
that management had some knowledge about them before the expansion took place and learned more
about them after the investment. Hence this result is consistent with both ex ante and ex post rationality
('learning by doing');
II) Significant support is only obtained in the fust step. This corroborates the hypotheses and that
management was aware of them ex ante. Ex post this knowledge was not improved (no 'learning by
doing');
III) Significant support is only obtained in [he second step. This corroborates the hypotheses and that
management had no ex ante knowledge about them, but learned about them by doing;
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IV) No support for the hypotheses is obtained in either s[ep. In this case the hypotheses are no[
corroborated.
These four possible results are summarized in table 1.
Insert table 1 about here
Details
Next we present a more detailed description of how the [wo steps are carried out. The firs[ step
involves the operationalization of the concept of 'random strategy', where firms choose at random from
the set of available investment opportunities, without considering the hypothesized benefits. The
opportunity set of investments for the 14 firms in our data set between 1966 and 1982 is operationalized
as follows. We take the set of all 498 ventures adopted by these firms during this period. Apparently
these ventures were perceived as profitable investments by at least one of the firms in the data set
(because of anticipated demand, available technology, etc.). From this opportunity set we calculated the
number of horizontal, related and vertical expansions that would have taken place if fvms had selected
from this set at random, given their actual number of expansions between 1966 and 1982. These numbers
are subsequently compared to the observed numbers of horizontal, related and vertical expansions by
these firms between 1966 and 1982. If the latter numbers are significantly larger than the former, this
supports the hypotheses in the first step. A more detailed description of the calculation is given in
Appendix A.
In the second step we examine differences in divestment rates associated with the various
directions and modes of corporate expansions. The analysis of individual expansions has several attractive
properties compared to the analysis of data at the more aggregate level of the fum. First, the analysis of
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individual expansions is likely to mitiga[e confounding industry-effects for the following reason. Previously
it has been documented that tirms that expand into related businesses are more successful than firms
that expand in[o unrelated businesses. However, as pointed out in Montgomery (1979) and Christenson
and Montgomery (1981), this evidence dces not necessarily imply that a strategy of related expansion is
more successful than a strategy of unrelated expansion, since related diversifiers tend to have their core
businesses in more profitable industries than unrelated diversifiers. Hence the result that related
diversifiers are more successful than unrelated diversifiers may be due to an indus[ry-effect: the
performance of the core businesses. This problem is mitigated in the present study that examines
indlvidual expaosionsg
Second, previous studies that analyze data at the level of the firm use subjectively chosen cut off
rates to classify firms in [erms of [he mode and d"uection of their expansion strategies (Pitts, 1974,
Rumelt, 1974, 1982, Simmonds, 1990). These arbitrary cut off rates are avoided in the present study
where we classify individual expansions. An expansion was classified as 'horizontal' if its 3-digit SBI-code
(the Dutch equivalent of the SIC-code) was equal to any of [he 3-digit codes of the businesses that the
fu-m was engaged in in 1966. It was called 'related' if it differed from these businesses in the third digit
but aot in the first or in the second digit 9 1o In all other cases the expansion was called 'unrelated'
unless in principle deGvery could take place from the expansion to other activities in [he firm or vice
versa. In that case the expansion was called 'vertical'.tl
Previous evaluations of the directions of corporate expansion may also suffer from omitted
variables-problems because they do not control for the mode and location of e~cpansions. Simmonds
(1990) argues that the direction and mode are interrelated and that any test of the relative success of
various directions of expansion that dces not control for the mode of expansion is underspecified and
may produce biased test results. A similar point can be made from Geringer et al. (1989) who argue that
the direction and location of corporate expansions aze interrelated. Both studies imply that empirical
studies should explicitly control for both the mode and location of expansions in order to avoid potential
omítted variables-problems. Our study is the first to perform this analysis.
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We end this section with a potential problem of analyzing dives[ment rates. Above we
hypothesized that the benefi[s from horiwntal, related and vertical expansions are relatively large and
that managers may learn about these benefits by doing, hence we expect more disappointments from
unrelated expansions and hence more divestures of such expansions. This prediction is tested on the basis
of data about observed divestures. A potential caveat is that not all divestures are necessarily failures.
Firms may acquire ano[her firm, reorganize it, and sell it a[ a profit. Furthermore, even if expansions are
failures they are not necessarily divested. In order to mitigate such problems, we used additional
information from the firms' annual report about whether the expansion was a failure or a success.12 To
reflect this additional information, we will speak in the remainder of this paper of 'failure' and 'success'
instead of divestures and non-divestures.
DATA
Data were obtained about 14 large non-financial fums in the Nctherlands. These firms werc
selected in the following way. We started with the 20 largest non-fmancial fvms (in terms of sales) listed
on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in 1988. No data were gathered about the 4 largest firms (Royal
Dutch, Unilever, Philips, Akzo) since these firms differ significandy from other firms, in [erms of the
breadth of activities, international scope, size, and so on.
For the remaining firms, we selected all expansions that were reported in the annual reports of
these firms between 1966 and 1982. For two firms, Nedlloyd and KLM, the informa[ion in the annual
reports resulted in low quality data on expansions. These two firms were omitted from the data seL The
sales, market value, direction and number of expansions of the remaining 14 firms are presented in table
2.
Insert table 2 about here
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Furthermore, ventures were labeled based on d'uect information from the annual report about
whether they were domestic or foreign, whether they were a start-up or an acquisition, and whether they
were a Failure or a success. A venture was only included in the data set if all required information could
be obtained from the annual report: d'uection and mode of expansion, domestic or foreign, and failure or
success.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Tests of the hypotheses in conjunction with the assumption of ex ante ra[ionality.
We first test the hypotheses [hat horizontal, related and vertical expansions are more frequent
and unrelated expansions are less frequent than in a world where fu-ms expand 'randomly', without
considering the benefits hypothesized by Hi - H3. The observed frequencies of horizontal, related and
vertical expansions rela[ive to unrelated expansions, p~, are calculated as N~ ~(N~ f N~), where j is [he
d'uection of expansion (horizontal, related or vertical), Ni is the number of observed expansions in
direction j and N~ is the number of observed unrelated expansions. These frequencies are calculated
from table 2 and presen[ed in column 1 of [able 3.
insert table 3 about here
Column 2 of this table presents the standard deviations associated with the frequencies in column 1,
calculated as p~(f-p~~N~ Column 3 of the table contains the raodom frequencies of the vazious
directions of corporate expansion that are calcula[ed on the basis of Appendix A. Finally, column 4
provides information about the significance of the difference between observed and random frequencies,
calculated as column 1 ( pl) minus column 3(f~), divided by column 2(s~).
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The following conclusions follow from table 3. The scores in columns 1 and 3 reveal that the
observed numbers of horizontal, related and vertical expansions are all above the numbers of such
expansions that would have been expected if fu-ms had expanded at random. Column 4 indicates tha[ all
three differences are significant. So the outcomes of this first step of our empirical analysis corroborate
the hypotheses H1 - H3 together with the assumption of ex ante rationality: that managers had
knowledge aboutthese hypotheses before the expansion took place,and acted accordingly.
Next we test the óypotheses H4 and H5. This means, in this first step of ow empirical analysis,
that we test the prediction that domestic acquisitions and foreign start-ups are more frequent than if
firms had expanded 'randomly', without considering the benefits hypothesized by H4 and H5. Thc
observed number of expansions in terms of mode and location are calculated from our data set and
presented in table 4.
insert table 4 about here
Table 4 also contains the expected number of such expansions, calculated from the relative marginal
frequcncies of the coatingency table 4, and presented in parentheses. These latter numbers represent the
expected expansions if firms had selected the mode and loca[ion independen[ of each other (given the
observed distribution over start-ups and acquisitions, and over domestic and foreign expansions). It also
follows from table 4 that domestic acquisitions and foreign start-ups are 'ovcrrepresenled' by 176 ~ 146
or 1.21 (210l0) and 130 ~ 101 or 1.29 (29010), respectively. The chi-square of the contingency table 4 is
35.9, which is significant at the 0.001 level. So the hypotheses H4 and HS are corroborated by the data,
together with the assumption of ex ante rationality.13
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Tests of the hypotheses in conjunction with the assumption of ex pos[ rationality.
We start the second step of our empirical analysis with a test of the prediction that horizontal,
related and vertical expansions are more successful than unrelated expansions. This prediction is tested in
such a way that other dimensions of [he fum's expansion strategy (mode, location) are explicitly
statistically controlled for. Since the dependent variable in our analysis: success rate, is a dichotomous
variable (success~failure), a logit model was specified. The following logit model was estimated:
1
Prob. (Success) - -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------










the probability of success of [he venture;
a dummy valued 1 if the venture is horizontal, else 0;
a dummy valued 1 if the venture is related, else 0;
a dummy valued 1 if the ven[ure is vertical, else 0;
a dummy valued 1 if the venture is a start-up, else 0;
a dummy valued 1 if the venture is domestic, else 0;
ccefficients.
(1)
The model was specified in such a way that the coefficients at, a2 and a3 re0ect the increase in success of
horizontal, related and vertical ventures, respectively, relative [o unrelated ventures. So we expect that at,
a2, a3 ~ 0. As explained earlier, the signs of aq and as are an empirical matter.
The model was estimated on all ventures listed in table 1(N - 498). Maximum IikeGhood-
estimates of the model are presented in table 5. The table also contains the standard errors and the
significance levels of the estimated ccefficients.~q
13
insert table 5 about here
Table 5 reveals that all three ccefficients associated with horizontal, related and vertical ventures
are positive and highly significant. Hence the evidence corroborates the hypotheses Ht - H3 in
conjunction with the assumption of ez post rationality: that managers learned about the hypotheses after
the expansion took place and acted accordingly.
Furthermore, the ccefficient associated with the mode of expansion is positive but insigniticant.
Hence like Simmonds, we find no empirical support for his hypothesis that start-ups are more successful
than acquisitions. Table 5 reveals no significan[ difference in success rates of foreign and domestic
expansions. However, as explained earlier, this may confound two opposing effects: of monopoly gains
and efficicncy gains.
The separate hypotheses are [ested in the following way. The data set is partitioned in subsets of
s[azt-ups (N - 194) and acquisi[ions (N - 304). The following logit model is estimated on these two
subsets:
1
prob. (Success) - ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- (2)
-(cpt t ctk(HOR) t c2~(REL) t cgk(VER) t c4k(LOC))
lte
Where k- {l, 2}; 1- start-up and 2- acquisition. Consistent with the hypothcses H4 and HS wc
expect that domestic acquisitions are more succcssful than foreign acquisitions but that foreign start-ups
are more successful than domestic start-ups, hence that c42 ~ 0, c41 ~ 0. In order to avoid potential
omitted variables-problems, the direction of expansion is also modelled. The estimation results from (2)
are presented in table 6.
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insert table 6 about here
The estimation results provide weak support for the Coasian efficiency-hypothesis and for [he rent-
hypothesis. Both coefficients c41 and c42 have the predicted sign and are almost significant at the 0.10 and
the 0.05 levcl, respectively.
Closer analysis of the ccefficients associated v~ith horizon[al, rela[ed aad ver[ical ventures reveals
an interesting difference between start-ups and acquis[ions. In the case of start-ups, all three coefficien[s
are insigniticant at [he 0.05 level, although c31, the coefficient associated with vertical expansion, is almost
significanL In eontrast, in the case of acquisitions all three coefficients associated with the direction of
expansions are highly significanL These results are consistent with the interpretation that management
has improved upon its ex an[e insights (that is, it has learned about the hypothesized benefits) from their
experience with acquisi[ions. No such Iearning effects are measured in case of start-ups.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides a new methodology to [est for hypothesized differential benefi[s from
various dimensions of corporate strategy: the direction, mode and location of corporate expansion. This
methodology is consistent with recent suggestions in Varadarajan and Ramanujam (1989). These authors
emphasize that previous studies in this literature analyze data at the level of the firm and are of a cross-
sectional nature. lnstead, these authors emphasize that there is a need for studies of individual expansion
projects and of the experience that management teams have acquired through these projects.
Our main empirical results are as follows. The evidence corroborates that strategies of horizon-
tal, related and vertical expansion are more beneficial to firms than a strategy of unrelated expansion.
We aLso found that managers knew about such benefits ex ante, before the expansion took place, and
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learned more about them ex post in case of acquisitions. No such learning effects were measured in case
of start-ups. Furthermore, we found support for the hypotheses that foreign stazt-ups induce relatively
large Coasian effciency gains and that domestic acquisitions induce relatively large monopoly gains.
Again our results indicate that managers knew about such gains ex ante and improved their knowledge
through expcrience with such expansions.
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FOOTNOTES
1. An alternative interpretation of this random strategy is that firms expand without considering their
present portfolio of activities, or Ihat they follow no strategy as far as the composition of the corpora[e
portfolio is concerned.
2. An alternative in[erpretation, more tlattering to most of us, is that managers learned about such
benefits from (more recent) MBA training, which they subsequent(y applied in practice.
3. Rugman (1985) azgues that in a world with increasing global compe[ition, monopolistic rent seeking
through market closing is largely irrelevanL Alternatively, Casson (1982) has argued that Coasian type
theory is largely tautological and has produced few testable hypo[heses.
4. Consistent with this view, we predicted earlier that horizontal expansion is more beneficial than
unrelated e~ansion due to economies of scale and~or monopoly gains.
5. Also other hypotheses could be formulated, such as that the monopoly gains from domestic
acquisitions are larger than the monopoly gains from domestic start-ups. The latter type of expansion
usually implies smaller increases in market share both because increases in sales aze more modest (at
least initially) and because no competitor is neutral'v,ed.
6. Analogous [o supra note 5, it can also be derived that foreign start-ups are more beneficial Ihan
foreign acquisitions.
7. This illustrates [ha[ testable imp6ca[ions can be derived from Coasian-type theory if some empirical
content is given to this thcory, e.g. by distinguishing between two modes of foreign direct investmenC
starl-ups and acyuisitions.
8. In theory, confounding industry-effects can also be mitigated by subtracting the performance of
individual fvms from the average performance in the industry. This procedure is adopted in Rumelt
(1982). Rumelts' method is not without problems. In practice industries aze no[ perfectly homogenous
and confounding industry-effects may not be neutralized completely. Moreover, precise data are hard or
impossible to obtain. Rumelt obtained data from annual repor[s, lOK statements, prospectuses,
investment analysts' reports, Moody's, and d'rrect inqu"uies. 'Despite these efforts, the data gathered could
scarcely be termed 'hard' or precise. Judgments óad to be made, interpolations were required, and more
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aggregate defuritions of 'industry' had [o be used in many cases.' ( Rumelt, 1982: 366, 367). The
methodology used in this paper is an alternative way of controlling for industry-effects and it is
interesting to find out whether it produces similar results as Rumelt (]982). For evidence on the
importance of industry-effects, see Schmalensee (1985) and Rumelt (1991).
9. The use of SIC-codes to classify ventures presumably produces a noisier indicator of the type of
ven[ure than a classification that involves a team of experts. Hence the likelihood that hypotheses are not
corroborated even if they are 'true' seems larger, unless the number of observations in the sample
becomes very large. Alternatively, if the hypotheses are corroborated using the noisier but more objective
indicator, this empirical result cannot be driven by possible biases from qualitative judgments by a team
of experts.
10. An example of the classification of firms in [erms of direction of expansion is Simmonds (1990) who
defines each four-digit SIC code as a unique business. All businesses wi[h the same first two digits of the
SIC-code are called related. Firms whose largest group of related businesses (two digit SIC code)
accounted for 40 percent or more of total firm sales were called related diversifiers, and those with less
than 40 pcrccnt werc considered unrelated diversifiers. Othcr cut-off rales are used in Rumelt (1974) and
in Pitts (1974). So like our study, studies such as Simmonds use SIC-codes as a classification device. In
addition these studies use arbitrary cut-off rates in order to classify firms in terms of their strategy. Such
cut-off rates are avoided in the present study. Furthermore, following Pitts (1974) and Lamont and
Anderson (1985), Simmonds classifies a fn-cn as externally diversified (that is, where acquisitions are
important) if inergers~acquisitions account for 10 percent or more of Ihe change in sales in the fum, else
it was called an internally diversified f;rm (that is, a firm where start-ups are important). Such arbitrary
cut-off rates are avoided in the presen[ study where the mode of an expansion is directly obtained from
[he firm's annual report.
11. The annual reports from which we obtained our data did not provide Wormation about actual
transfers of goods and services, so it was evaluated whether such lransfers could, in principle, take place.
This adds some noise to the analysis, since not all transfers that might take place actually do take place.
So the same disclaimer applies as in supra note 10, J we Gnd that the óypothesis that vertical cxpansions
are more successful than unrelated ones is not corroborated.
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12. Whclhcr a vcnlurc was classificd as a succcs.5 or failurc was dclcrmincd as foltows. If a ncw vcnturc
was retained for the rest of the period (until 1988) it was called a success, unless lhere were indications
in the annual report that it was no[. If a new venture was divested after problems were reported, it was
called a failure. If no problems were reported but the venture was divested within 5 years, it was also
called a failure. If it was divested after 5 years and no other information could be obtained, the venture
was left out of the analysis.
13. Note, however, that the evidence provides a joint test of [he hypotheses. So in theory the evidence
can also be explained by the hypotheses suggested in supra note 5 and 6.
14. Significance levels are calculated on the basis of the Wald statistic. For lazge sample sizes, the test
that a ccefficient is 0 can be based on this statistic, that has a chi-square distribution.
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APPENDIX
This appendix explains how the frequencies of horiwntal, related and vertical expansions in case
of random strategies (as given in the column labeled f~ in table 3) are calculated.
For each company i one or more three-digit codes are identified: the 3-digit industries in which
the company participated in 1966. These are "company i's original activities". Each venture is characteri-
zed by its 3-digit code. Then a~ is determined as [he number of ventures in the data set having the same
3-digit code as onc of company i's original activi[ies. Thus a~ is the number of ventures in lhc data sel
that for fum i can be regarded as horizontal. Of course some of these ventures may have been realized
by a company other than i. If firm i follows a random strategy, we expect
a
a~- 498
-nt horizontal expansions, where n~ is the actual number of ventures undertaken by
company i belwecn 1966 and 1982. Analogously Li~ is defncd as the numbc:r of ventures in thc daln sct,
that for company i, are identified as related (the first two digits correspond to one of company i's original
activities). Finally y~ is defined as the number of ventures in the sample that could have a relationship as
supplier or customer for one of company i's original activities and thus for company i can be regarded as
vertical.
Define 6~- ~~ .n~ and c~- Y~ .n~ . Then b~ and c~ are the number of related or vertical
498 498
expansions one would expect for firm i, if fum i followed a random s[rategy. Then A-~ o~
i
B-~ b~ and C-~ c~ are the total number of horizontal, related and vertical expansions one would
! i
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expect if all firms follow a random strategy.
Let D- 498 - A- B- C Then fa-`~ is the expected frequency of horizontal expansions
AtD
in case of random strategies. Similarly fe-B and jc~C are the expected frequencies or
BtD CtD
related and vertical expansions in case of random strategies. The numbers given in the column labeled f~
in table 3 are fA, fB and f~.
~
TABLE 1






corroborated: hyp. t corroborated: hyp. t
ex ante t ex post ez ante rationality
rationality
III IV





Salese Market Valuea Hor. Rel. UnreL Vert.
Ahold 14.638 2.770 9 5 4 3
DSM 10.121 4.620 14 5 21 6
Hoogovens 7.868 2.239 3 16 15 11
Heinekcn 6.104 4.390 17 3 2 4
DAF 5.201 1.583 3 0 8 i l
Buhrmann-T 4.569 2.101 24 18 10 3
Wessanen 3.806 1.479 8 12 1 0
KBB 3.025 809 4 3 4 0
HBG 3.020 610 9 0 3 1
Hua[er pougl. 2.783 1.841 25 15 3 2
Internatio M. 2.649 497 13 4 18 3
KNP 2.510 2.278 10 10 0 4
VNU 2.504 1.421 19 1 8 12
VOC 2.410 666 58 11 17 5
216 103 114 65
e In millions of dutch guilders. The figures aze [he 1988 sales and mazket value.
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TABLE 3
Observed expansions and expansioas expected from 'random' strategies: directions.
Pj j fj (pj-fj)~sj
Horizon[al 0.655 0.026 0.074 22.35
Related 0.475 0.034 0.179 8.71
Vertical 0.363 0.036 0.082 7.81
2fi
TABLE 4
Observed expansions and expansions expected from 'random' strategics: mode and location.
Location Domes[ic Foreign
Mode
Start-up 64 (94) 130 (101)
Acquisition 176 (146) 128 (157)
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TABLE 5
Ma~mum IikeGhood-estimates of the model of equation (1).
Ccefficient ao al a2 a3 a4 as
Estimate -0.2252 0.9031 0.9388 1.8227 0.1381 -0.2131
Stand.crrcir 0.2507 0.24(2 0.2R3Ci 0.3819 0.2055 0.2010
Si~. level. 0.3690 0.0002 0.0009 0.0000 0.5014 0.2890
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TABLE 6
Maximum likelihood-estima[es of the model of equation (2): Start-ups and acquisitions
Start-ups
Ccefficient cpl ctt c21 c31 e41
Estimate 0.5809 -0.0923 -0.3213 1.2495 -0.5425
Stand. error 0.3819 0.4088 0.4669 0.6399 0.3375
Sign. level 0.1282 0.8213 0.4913 0.0509 0.1080
Acquisitions
Ccefficient coz clz ~iz ~z caz
Estima[e -0.8258 1.4456 1.6627 1.9802 0.5123
S[and. error 0.3074 0.3232 0.3790 0.4830 0.2b95
Sign. Icvel 0.0072 0.00(N) 0.(NN10 O.INNNI 0.0573
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